The politics of ports in the Horn: War, peace and Red Sea rivalries by Styan, David
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Styan, David (2018) The politics of ports in the Horn: War, peace and Red
Sea rivalries. Royal African Society.
Downloaded from: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/41075/
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
African Arguments (Royal Africa Society), London  
The politics of ports in the Horn: War, peace and Red Sea rivalries,  
How national, regional and international competition over ports is shaping political 
alliances and enmities across the Red Sea zone.  
David Styan, July 18, 2018 
http://africanarguments.org/2018/07/18/politics-ports-horn-war-peace-red-sea-
rivalries/ 
David Styan, July 18, 2018. 1800 w (from v 2600w) 
http://africanarguments.org/2018/07/18/politics-ports-horn-war-peace-red-sea-rivalries/ 
For over 25 years, maritime strategy and port development in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
appeared relatively static. Eritrea looked inwards, neglecting its coast. Djibouti flourished, 
lucratively embracing Ethiopia’s trade, overseas investors and foreign military bases. 
Somalia’s shores became synonymous with piracy, prompting Western and Asian naval 
manoeuvres, quietly ensuring free passage to the Suez Canal.But now things may be 
changing. Ports in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden are suddenly in the spotlight.  
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly emphasised port developments in his 
whistle-stop tour of neighbouring countries, including Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti. The 
rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea raises the possibility that the mothballed 
Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa could be rehabilitated. And just 25km across the Bab 
al-Mandab straits, the war in Yemen has given nearby African ports new geostrategic 
significance; the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been using its base in Eritrea’s port of 
Assab to besiege and bomb Yemen’s crucial port of Hodeida since mid-June.These 
developments beg three key questions. Firstly, why are countries in the Horn of Africa 
developing so many new ports? Secondly, who will finance these projects? And finally, how 
do control of ports in the Horn relate to the war in Yemen? 
Why so many new ports? 
The first question is the most straightforward. The Horn needs improved ports and 
infrastructure to handle the current pace of Ethiopia’s economic growth, on which broader 
regional integration and prosperity relies. This is why ports have been one of Prime Minister 
Abiy’s priorities on his foreign visits. In Djibouti, he called for joint investment in the tiny 
nation’s ports. In Sudan, he and President Omar al-Bashir presented plans to modernise Port 
Sudan together. And in Somalia, he announced that Ethiopia would work with Mogadishu to 
upgrade four Somali ports.  
Land-locked Ethiopia is clearly looking to break its heavy dependence on Djibouti, which has 
handled 90% of its foreign trade since the border war with Eritrea was triggered in 1998. 
However, it is crucial to understand that Addis is only seeking to diversify its access to the 
sea and drive-down freight costs via increased competition rather than reduce its use of 
Djibouti. In fact, these trade volumes will continue to grow as Ethiopian, Chinese and 
Djiboutian authorities have invested heavily in upgrading and enhancing infrastructure 
capacity along the Djibouti corridor.  
Earlier this year, Ethiopia completed the centrepiece of this strategy: the 750km railway 
linking Addis Ababa to Djibouti. The $3.4 billion project – financed, constructed and 
managed by China – has drastically cut the time and cost of shuttling containers between 
Ethiopia’s capital, its nascent manufacturing export zones, and Djibouti’s ports. The 
development of prospective oil and gas projects in Ethiopian Ogaden and neighbouring 
Somali states, which would also be exported via Djibouti, reaffirms the port nation’s ongoing 
centrality to regional growth and integration.  
This relationship is as crucial to Djibouti as it is to Ethiopia. Port transit fees are the mainstay 
of Djibouti’s exchequer and it has invested substantially in further developing this 
infrastructure. It constructed vast new container and cargo ports in the form of the $590 
million Multi-Purpose Port (MPP) at Doraleh. Meanwhile, it has begun developing smaller 
ports too. Tadjourah, is designed to handle Ethiopia’s potash; Damerjog will have facilities to 
export livestock and liquid natural gas (LNG). Djibouti’s ambitious “Vision 2035” blueprint for 
national development sees its harbours as a hub for Asian transhipments, servicing the 
entire region. As it develops ports and extensive Free Trade Zones with its Chinese partners, 
the entrepôt nation will remain critical for Ethiopia and prospects of regional economic 
integration, irrespective of developments in Eritrea or Somalia. It also seeks to maintain its 
competitively vis-à-vis Kenya’s LAPSSET corridor, which aims to link its coast at Lamu to 
South Sudan and Ethiopia. 
Who’s paying? 
The second question this raises is who is paying for all this. For Ethiopia and Djibouti, the key 
actor is China. Djibouti’s major infrastructure initiatives are being financed and spearheaded 
by Chinese companies. Djibouti’s new multi-million MPP facility at Doraleh, for example, is 
managed and part-owned by China Merchants Group (CMG). Since 2013, the Hong Kong-
based conglomerate has owned 23.5% of Djibouti’s Port and Free Zone Authority (DPFZA) 
and, in early 2017, bought a minority stake in Ethiopia’s state-owned shipping line, whose 
home port is Djibouti.  
CMG is a leading commercial actor in numerous ports along China’s Maritime Silk Road, 
which links shipping lanes along Beijing’s global Belt and Road Initiative. As Thierry Pairault 
has highlighted, CMG’s role in Djibouti mirrors Chinese involvement in ports and logistics 
elsewhere in Africa. However, Djibouti is unique in two ways: firstly, it is a 
telecommunications hub where several key transcontinental submarine fibre-optic cables 
meet; and secondly, it has been home to China’s first permanent overseas naval base since 
2017, when it opened next to the MPP. Chinese companies also have significant stakes in 
Ethiopia’s oil and gas fields in the Ogaden region. In November 2017, they agreed to 
construct a 650km oil pipeline to Djibouti and proposed building a LNG refinery at 
Damerjog. 
The other key actor is the UAE. Until the opening of the China-run MPP in Djibouti last year, 
all of Ethiopia’s container traffic was channelled through the adjacent Doraleh Container 
Terminal (DCT). This facility had been managed and part-owned by the Dubai-based 
company DP World since 2008, but this February, Djibouti unilaterally terminated its 
contract and nationalised its 33% shareholding. This was the culmination of a fractious six-
year legal battle.  
DP World is seeking compensation for its lost assets, and until the case is resolved in a 
London court, the Djiboutian government will have difficulty selling the sequestered shares 
legally. However, given Abiy’s surprise proposal that Ethiopia and Djibouti hold stakes in 
each other’s ports and telecommunications, it is possible that Ethiopia may obtain a 
minority shareholding in Doraleh Container Terminal. This could plausibly be part of a deal 
involving Chinese loans that could also see CMG gain a bigger slice of DPFZA equity.  
While this spat has seen UAE’s long-standing involvement in Djibouti diminish, DP World is 
simultaneously increasing its footprint in neighbouring ports. In May 2016, the company 
signed a 30-year deal worth $440 million to develop Berbera port in the self-declared state 
of Somaliland. In March 2018, DP World scaled back its proposed investment, but 
announced that Ethiopia would take a 19% stake in the project, alongside its own 51% share 
and the Somaliland government’s 30%.  
The company is also investing in building a highway to link the port to Ethiopia’s border. 
Meanwhile, the deal has allowed the UAE, which is playing an increasingly central role in the 
war in Yemen, to develop a naval base alongside Berbera. 
The DP World deal is the first large international contract signed by the autonomous 
government of Somaliland. This has angered the Federal Government of Somalia, which 
doesn’t recognise the Somaliland government’s sovereignty over Berbera. This has, in turn, 
fuelled a spat between Somalia and the UAE, leading the latter to withdraw military supplies 
and advisors and close the hospital it was funding in Mogadishu. The row also compounded 
allegations that the Somali government is being manipulated by Qatar and its ally Turkey. 
Qatar reportedly helped finance President Mohamed “Farmaajo’s” election campaign, while 
Turkey is the Somali government’s leading economic partner.  
What are the UAE’s port plans for Yemen and the Horn?  
The fact that the UAE’s involvement in Berbera has enabled it to set up a naval base there 
leads us to our third question: how is competition over new container and cargo ports 
linked to the war in Yemen?  
This is the most difficult to answer, but it is clear that as the UAE’s prosecution of the war 
against the Houthis has intensified, so has their engagement in the Horn of Africa. Since 
2015, the UAE has massed military and naval hardware alongside covert training and 
detention facilities in the Eritrean port of Assab. Its armed forces are also now present in 
Berbera in Somaliland (as well as Socotra island and on Yemen’s southern coast).  
Is the war in Yemen also the reason that UAE authorities now appear to be investing 
energetically in diplomatic overtures to both Ethiopia and Eritrea? In May, Prime Minister 
Abiy visited the UAE. In June, Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan of Abu 
Dhabi (MBZ) returned the favour. During this visit, the UAE’s de facto ruler announced a $1 
billion emergency loan to ease Ethiopia’s acute forex shortage and promised further foreign 
direct investment.  
It was then an Emirates plane that ferried the Eritrean delegation to Addis on 26 June. 
Furthermore, Eritrea’s President Isaias Afewerki was subsequently welcomed to Abu Dhabi 
prior to Abiy’s arrival and effusive proclamation of peace in Asmara on 8 July. 
There are also recent hints from Saudi Arabia and UAE suggesting they may back Ethio-
Eritrean rapprochement with substantial funds. Some analysts claim these would be used 
firstly to rehabilitate Eritrea’s ports of Assab and Massawa. They would then help finance 
infrastructure linking Assab to Addis Ababa and, far more ambitiously, Massawa to Mekelle, 
the capital of Ethiopia’s Tigray region.  
This may be wishful thinking, and/or Gulf Arabs’ hubris. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has 
ambitious, fully-costed long-term infrastructure plans, involving rail, road, air, and sea 
routes. Encouraging rival Arab and Chinese investors to compete for a share of the profits 
from integrating Eritrea’s ports back into Addis’s long-term infrastructure plans should be 
relatively straightforward. Whether Eritrea’s dilapidated authorities can now undertake 
domestic economic reforms and facilitate competitive tendering for new port and maritime 
services, while fulfilling short-term pledges to the UAE, is far less certain. 
It is unclear how realistic the suggestion of Arab finance behind the peace-deal is. It is also 
impossible to tell whether the UAE’s recent diplomatic activism reflects a medium-term 
political strategy or whether it is simply an opportunistic response to changes in the Horn 
and a tactical stop-gap in the bloody stalemate in Yemen.  
Does the UAE have a concerted plan in the Horn of Africa? Does it foresee that its military 
lease of Assab could be transferred to DP World once Yemen’s Houthis have been 
bombarded or starved into submission?   
It is too early to tell, but what is clear is that the ports in the Horn of Africa are proving to be 
of increasingly interest to rival Arab and Chinese investors and that the politics of ports have 
become central in shaping political alliances and enmities across the region.  
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